Not all phishing is equal. The classification matters because it determines investigation priority, containment urgency, and which user population is at risk.
The Phishing Taxonomy
Tier 1: Generic Phishing
Target: Anyone, no personalization. Lure: Package delivery, IRS notice, password expiration, security alert, prize notification. Volume: High — millions of identical or templated emails per campaign. Click rate: Low (< 2%) due to lack of personalization, but high volume means many victims.
Detection indicators:
- Generic greeting (“Dear Valued Customer,” “Hi there”)
- Sender domain registered within 30 days
- Identical or near-identical emails to multiple employees
- Link leads to credential-harvest page or malware download
SOC urgency: Medium — contain the email, search for other recipients.
Tier 2: Spear-Phishing
Target: Specific named individuals or roles. Lure: Personalized using victim’s name, role, manager name, current projects, org structure. Volume: Low — a few targeted emails per campaign. Research source: LinkedIn, company website, press releases, prior breaches.
Detection indicators:
- Personal salutation with correct first name
- References to real colleagues, managers, or projects (researched from OSINT)
- Sent to a small number of specific targets (not mass distribution)
- Link or attachment relevant to the victim’s role (invoice for finance, HR doc for HR)
Tier 3: Whaling
Target: Senior executives (CEO, CFO, CISO, board). Lure: Board-level themes: merger information, regulatory notice, investor inquiry, legal matter. Volume: Very low — may target a single individual. Research: Deep OSINT — press releases, SEC filings, conference speaking, LinkedIn activity.
SOC urgency: Critical — executive credentials have highest blast radius (wire authority, M&A access, security override capability).
Tier 4: Business Email Compromise (BEC)
Definition: Email fraud using social engineering (not necessarily malware) to manipulate wire transfers, tax forms (W-2/W-9), or credentials.
Three sub-types:
- CEO fraud: Impersonate executive → pressure subordinate to wire funds urgently
- Vendor fraud: Impersonate vendor → change payment account to attacker-controlled
- Internal account compromise: Attacker takes over a real employee’s email → conducts BEC from the inside
Key BEC indicators:
- Wire transfer, direct deposit change, or W-2 request
- “Confidential — don’t discuss with others” — to prevent victim from verifying
- Urgency + secrecy combination
- New bank account not in ERP/accounting system
- Reply-to differs from From:
Tier 5: AiTM (Adversary-in-the-Middle)
How it works:
Victim AiTM Proxy Real IdP (Microsoft/Okta)
│ │ │
│── clicks phishing link ──►│ │
│ │── forwards login page ──►│
│◄── receives real login ───│◄── sends real login ─────│
│── enters credentials ────►│── forwards creds ────────►│
│ │◄── sends MFA challenge ───│
│◄── receives MFA push ─────│ │
│── approves MFA ──────────►│── forwards MFA ──────────►│
│ │◄── session token ─────────│
│◄── forwards session ──────│ ATTACKER COPIES TOKEN │
The attacker’s proxy captures the session cookie after MFA completes. They use this cookie to authenticate without the victim’s credentials or MFA device.
AiTM toolkits (known):
- EvilProxy
- NakedPages
- Tycoon 2FA
- Evilginx2
AiTM detection: Not in the email — in the identity logs. Look for:
- Sign-in from new IP shortly after the phishing email was delivered
- MailItemsAccessed from that new IP (attacker reading mail)
- New-InboxRule created (attacker setting up forwarding)
- OAuth consent grant to unfamiliar application
Tier 6: HTML Smuggling
What it is: Payload delivered inside HTML instead of as a file attachment. The email body or an HTML attachment contains Base64-encoded data that JavaScript assembles into an executable when the email is opened in a browser.
Why it bypasses filters: Email gateways scan attachments. An HTML file that contains encoded JavaScript — not an .exe, .docm, or .pdf — may pass through without triggering attachment scanners.
Detection in email: Content-Type: text/html attachment containing Base64 blob + JavaScript with document.createElement('a') and .click() — these are the payload delivery triggers.
Tier 7: Reply-Chain Hijacking
What it is: Injection of a malicious email into an existing legitimate email thread. The attacker has compromised a mailbox (or obtained thread content via OSINT/prior breach) and replies to an ongoing conversation with a malicious attachment or link.
Why it’s high-risk: The victim trusts the context (ongoing conversation with known colleague) and doesn’t apply the same scrutiny they would to a cold email.
Detection: The injected email’s headers won’t match the prior thread’s mail servers. The reply-to may be subtly different. The attachment wasn’t mentioned in prior thread content.